Sunset clauses
Sunset clauses in Queensland off-the-plan contracts have been considered by the courts a number of times in recent years.
The issue is particularly important for off-the-plan apartment developments. Amendments to the Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld) in 2023 introduced restrictions on when a seller can terminate an off-the-plan land contract under a sunset clause. However, those restrictions do not apply to proposed lots in community titles schemes.
For buyers of off-the-plan apartments, townhouses and other properties in community titles schemes, this means that the terms of the contract, and the circumstances in which the developer seeks to rely on a sunset clause, are critical to determining whether the developer has a right to terminate.
A number of recent court decisions in Queensland have considered the rights of developers to terminate community titles scheme off-the-plan contracts. In JYP Jiang Pty Ltd v CAV Gasworks Pty Ltd [2025] QSC 134, for example, the Supreme Court of Queensland held that a developer was not entitled to terminate two off-the-plan apartment contracts under a sunset clause.
The latest Supreme Court of Queensland decision on this issue is Malligan v Chevron Apartments Pty Ltd; Cantavenera v Chevron Apartments Pty Ltd [2026] QSC 195 (Malligan).
What happened in this case?
Chevron Apartments Pty Ltd (Chevron) proposed to develop a 40-storey residential building containing more than 230 apartments on Chevron Island. In 2021, Ms Cantavenera and Ms Salonia contracted to purchase proposed unit 1305 for $840,000, and Ms Malligan contracted to purchase proposed unit 703 for $760,000.
Each contract fixed a “Sunset Date” five years after its Contract Date.
Chevron purported to terminate both contracts shortly after their respective Sunset Dates passed without settlement, in reliance on a “sunset” clause in each contract.
Both buyers disputed Chevron’s entitlement to terminate under that clause.
Why did “must” matter?
The buyers argued that Chevron was not entitled to terminate the contracts under the sunset clause because, to do so, Chevron would be relying on its own breach of clause 10.2 of each contract. That clause provided that, subject to the buyer paying the balance purchase price and Chevron’s termination rights under another clause (clause 16), Chevron “must establish the Scheme, register the Plan and effect Settlement under this Contract by the Sunset Date”.
Justice Freeburn considered what a reasonable businessperson would have understood clause 10.2 to mean, having regard to the text, context and purpose of the contracts. He considered that the contracts used the words “may” and “must” in a deliberate way, and the requirement that Chevron “must” establish the Scheme, register the Plan and settle the contracts by the Sunset Date was unambiguous and susceptible of only one meaning.
Chevron’s arguments
First argument: reading down the clause
Chevron’s first argument in response was that the words “must … effect Settlement” in clause 10.2 gave rise to an implied term that Chevron was required to use reasonable efforts to achieve settlement, and that it had done so. Justice Freeburn rejected that construction for a number of reasons, including that an implied obligation to use “reasonable efforts” or “best endeavours” could not be readily implied from the mandatory word “must”.
Chevron also relied on the uncertainty affecting the construction industry during the COVID-19 period at the time the contracts were entered into. The Court considered that it was not necessary to have recourse to events, circumstances and things external to the contracts in circumstances where the words of clause 10.2 were plain. The judgement also noted that the clause expressly referred to and preserved Chevron’s rights under clause 16, which gave it extensive rights to terminate and sufficiently addressed the uncertainty of the COVID-19 era.
Second argument: could Chevron rely on its own failure to settle?
Chevron also argued that the balance of the contracts construed as a whole and in context expressed a “sufficiently clear” intention that Chevron (and the buyers) would be entitled to terminate if the Sunset Date passed.
The Court applied the principle that unless a contract clearly provides otherwise, a party cannot obtain a contractual benefit from its own breach. Justice Freeburn found that there was no clear express provision in the contracts that justified the Court permitting a party to rely on their own breach of contract as a basis for terminating.
Third argument: termination otherwise justified
Chevron argued that its termination was justified because it could have terminated under clauses 4 or 10.1 of the contract. The Court rejected that those clauses gave Chevron termination rights in these circumstances because:
- clause 4 gave Chevron the right to terminate if it was not the registered owner by the “Settlement Date”, which had not occurred; and
- clause 10.1 identified matters required before settlement, but did not create an independent termination right.
Chevron also argued that incomplete later stages, continuing construction and increased body corporate and insurance costs materially prejudiced the buyers under section 214 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld). Chevron submitted that this activated its reciprocal termination right under clause 25(c), which was therefore also available at the time of termination.
In considering this argument, Justice Freeburn referred to the consideration of “material prejudice” by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd v Wilson [2010] QCA 322 as requiring substantial or important disadvantage assessed objectively in the circumstances of each buyer. The Court found that the building appeared largely complete, Chevron had produced no evidence that the remaining work would be prolonged, and the increased contributions and insurance costs were insufficient in the context of the contracts. The buyers therefore had no right to terminate under section 214, and Chevron had no corresponding right under clause 25(c).
What does the decision mean?
The Court declared both contracts in this instance as valid and binding. However, whether there are termination rights in an off-the-plan contract available to a developer after a sunset date has passed and, if so, whether those rights are qualified in any way will depend on the specific terms of each contract.
Chevron has recently filed appeals in respect of this decision in the Queensland Court of Appeal.[1] It therefore remains to be seen whether this is the final outcome for Chevron buyers. The final outcome of this matter should be closely considered by buyers of off-the-plan contracts with similarly worded obligations on developers that they “must” complete certain steps by a sunset date.
[1] Queensland Court of Appeal proceedings numbers 4377/26 and 4378/26. Notices of appeal were lodged in both proceedings on 16 September 2026.